PATTERN OF NTSB OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Officials in control of the NTSB were heavily involved in the aviation related corruption. I first presented evidence of the criminality associated with a series of airline crashes in 1963. Before those reports, my predecessor on the United DC-8 program had done the same. Many crashes followed my warnings to the NTSB. Under federal statutory and case law, their coverup and refusal to perform their duty made them as guilty as the principals at United Airlines and the FAA. This deep involvement as co-conspirators prevents the NTSB from ever conducting an in-depth investigation into the underlying air safety problems.
Donald Madole, a former FAA attorney during the investigation of the New York City and Denver crashes [and subsequently chief of the air safety section of the Civil Aeronautic Board](16) knew the relationship between safety problems and the resulting crashes. He was the FAA attorney in charge of the NTSB hearing into the United Airlines DC-8 crash at Denver in the fall of 1961. Frank Harrell had contacted him in Washington prior to that crash, as well as prior to the United DC-8 crash into New York City, describing the rampant corruption within the FAA and at United Airlines. By now, Madole knew as well as anyone the price the public and the crews paid for the deeply entrenched pattern of corruption and coverups.
Several times I put the NTSB on notice in such a way that they could not sidestep the issues. I sent to the head of the NTSB a several-hundred-page document specifically... identifying the pattern of air safety and criminal actsassociated with a series of airline crashes in which the NTSB played a role through their coverups. I demanded a meaningful reply from the NTSB, and they refused to provide one.
I sought assistance by writing to Colorado Representative McVicker, who represented my home district in Colorado at that time. The letter explained the NTSB involvement in the scandal, the report that I had sent to the NTSB, and my inability to obtain a response. McVicker wrote to the NTSB and received a reply stating: "Our Bureau of Investigation [has] been unable to substantiate his allegations relating to safety hazards." The NTSB advised that the Congressman "will be ... advised ... if subsequent review produces any information relevant to a hazard in aviation safety."
The NTSB had access to thousands of pages of evidence that I introduced into the Denver grievance hearing, and had the proof supporting my charges. These were not difference-of-opinion or poorjudgment charges that I brought to their attention. They were hard-core air safety and criminal violations. Certainty of recurring crashes from the uncorrected corruption didn't appear sufficient cause for either McVicker or the NTSB to address my charges. Seeking to force them into action, I wrote to McVicker nine months
16) Later renamed National Transportation Safety Board.