Federal directives require the head of any federal agency to report any criminal allegations made by an employee to the U.S. Department of Justice. Since I had made serious allegations it is safe to assume that Justice Department officials knew of my charges, knew of the tactics used to silence me, and had approved the actions. Also, prior to the start of the hearing, I made formal complaints of criminal misconduct to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Justice, putting them on notice of the charges. Instead of conducting an investigation, they engaged in a coverup. Not once, to this day, did the FBI or any other division in the U.S. Department of Justice examine my evidence or receive my testimony. The coverup had, of course, tragic consequences.
The FAA Administrator appointed an attorney from his staff, William Jennings, to act as the hearing officer. This hearing to receive testimony and evidence continued for approximately six weeks, followed by two months for submitting opening and reply briefs.
FORTUITOUS FINDING SHOWING THE PRIMARY
CAUSE OF THE WORLD'S WORST AIR DISASTER
I paid Denver attorney J.E. Kuttler to represent me at this hearing, but his performance was so grossly unsatisfactory that I dismissed him before the end of our first hour of the FAA hearing. It appeared he was deliberately sabotaging me, or was incompetent As Kuttler gathered his folders from the conference table to turn over to me, he accidentally picked up one of many folders belonging to FAA attorney Donald Boberick, and gave it to me, thinking it was one of mine. That one act resulted in discovery of a document detailing criminal activities by United Airlines that played a role in some of the nation's worst air disasters.
After the first day's hearing, I carried home three suitcases containing copies of FAA reports to be introduced during subsequent hearings. As I worked late into the night preparing for the next day's presentation, I discovered the folder Kuttler accidentally picked up. Inside was a sequestered government document that was dynamite. The October 16, 1960, document, prepared and signed by several FAA inspectors, described the pattern of falsified training and competency-check flights and the falsification of records by United management. Arguably, the revealed criminal activities made the air safety and criminal violations into capital offenses.
If this report were known to the public and its importance recognized, the financial liabilities of United Airlines to the next-of-kin would skyrocket. Huge punitive damages, not covered by insurance, would be justified. United Airlines stock could plummet, and cause huge losses to individuals and corporations holding the stock. An exposure would show the nation's primary air safety agency engaging in rampant corruption.
The report didn't expose anything that the inspectors didn't already know, but it was hard evidence to enable others to recognize the gravity of the corruption associated with several recent air disasters involving United Airlines.
FAA attorney Boberick knew about the criminal activities that played a causative role in recent air disasters. He had the hidden report, knew of highly critical Washington reports, and had received complaints from other FAA inspectors. Despite this knowledge, and despite the brutal price that would be paid if the corruption was not exposed, this FAA attorney, and the FAA legal division, spent the few months of hearing and brief-writing, lying about the problems.
THE HIDDEN REPORT WAS A BLOCKBUSTER
The sequestered government report did more than anything else to explain why the New York City, Denver, and earlier crashes occurred. It was a blockbuster. The report stated in part:
Mr. Butler stated, 'following an inspection and cross-check of United's training and maintenance records," what had disappointed him was that when he or Harrell were on board, the check takes three to three-and-a-half hours, but on inspection of the [aircraft] log book to see how long they were taking when we were NOT on board, it had been taking one hour fifteen minutes to one hour thirty minutes, and we just could not understand how they could do all the required [training-check] maneuvers in that time when the second in command was also being checked. A memorandum of that type was undoubtedly preceded by many other inspector reports, but I did not have subpoena power to get them. On the other hand, Boberick probably had many of them in his possession.
INTRODUCING THE EXPLOSIVE REPORT
At the start of the hearing the following day, the FAA legal counsel asked if I had found one of his folders. I admitted that I had, and that I was about to introduce a copy of the contents of the folder into the hearing record. Boberick strongly protested the introduction of that highly sensitive document, which was hardly indicative of the FAA's primary duty to expose safety problems. Hearing Officer Jennings, also an attorney, tried to prevent the introduction of the report. Over Boberick's strong objections the report was...